Spent fuel.. There is a lot of it laying about US installations. (20
to 30 years worth).
Doesn't answer the question, "What percentage would really be carried
aloft?" And of that carried aloft and spread over 'three or four states',
what would be the concentration on the ground and in the environment in that
land area? How does that concentration compare to background radiation
levels and dose? I suspect you have *not* done the math you claim you have.
Otherwise you wouldn't be making such outlandish claims of
death/destruction.
My previous posts only factored in the contents of the Reactor itself.
(Which will be operating at full power when the event occurs. )
What do you think the current operating power level has to do with anything?
Or do you just mention it to try and scare the masses into thinking its
somehow relavent. Considering plants operate at full power about 90% of the
time, it's hardly a stroke of genious to assume an attack would happen while
at power.
Do you think that is the plant's most vulnerable condition?
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ (1/4 of a mile)..
There dozens of ways to deliver a N-weapon right NEXT to the
containment.. (Especially, if they have smart(human) guidance system.
I don't think terrorists have a problem with that aspect.)
Really? Dozens? Name three.
A human with a device walking into a facility would be stopped at the
security entrance. This is more than 1/4 mile from the containment in most
plants. His device would set off several different alarms. Someone trying
to gain access via other than authorized access points faces a number of
formidable barriers. Attempting to breach such barriers is now instantly
considered a threat to the general public and deadly force is authorized to
stop anyone making such an attempt. (I wonder if the 'greenpeace' folks
that tried such things in the 70's and early 80's would try them today)
No ground-based vehicle can get that close either (despite your citation
below that is completely outdated). Guess that leaves airborne threats.
Well, maybe that's one. But 'dozens of ways'? Now you're just trying to
use scare tactics and fearmongering.
Yes, (see above.) Total destruction..
Manhattan, You kill a few hundred thousand, maybe 1/2 million.
or
Take out Nuclear plant when wind blowing towards food growing
and population centers.
Kill a smaller number outright.
Take out three or four states for the next 1000 years.
Create ten's of millions penniless of refugees..
Decrease their average lifespan by 5 to ~10 years.
(economic ruin/poverty is just as deadly as radiation.)
(assumes evac will be 100% successful & permanent)
Economic loss 3 to 5 times that of GDP.
(Equivalent to 24 to 40 million deaths.. @ 1M$ of GDP per person
lifetime.)
Cripple the country with huge re-occuring burden.
Unsupported claptrap. Even if a nuc plant were attacked, the likelyhood of
your scenario is more remote than even you could calculate. Even if as much
radioactivity went airborne as you claim, the affects on the land-use and
people you claim are unsubstantiated. Look at how 'uninhabitable' the area
around Chernobyl is today just 20 years later. Activity might be
*detectable* over the entire continent. But *detectable* and
*uninhabitable* are a far cry from each other.
Ten tactical nucs set off in the largest US population centers would have
worse effects and would be easier to carry out (not that it would be
'easy'). Yet you seem to be implying that ten nucs at nuclear plants is a
more credible threat. Despite the stronger security, you think a terrorist
would rather go after a hardened, secure target than the superbowl stadium
in front of live TV? or a presidential inaugaration?
Almost any approach path in excess of XX meters will do.
By sea, land or air. Anything method that avoids the front gate.
Most of those detectors aren't designed to detect N-weapons.
They sample the air stream for airborne radioactive particles.
Guess you've never had to enter a nuclear plant. Radioactive air samplers
are used for detecting the *release* of radioactive material, not *security*
of incoming personnel/equipment. Different things, different purposes,
different methodologies.
N-weapons aren't designed to deposit any significant materials into
the atmosphere until they go off.
(Two city blocks), 1056 ft @ 20 mph.== about 36 seconds of warning and
time to deploy counter measures without setting off the weapon.
Only if a vehicle could maintain 20 mph through whatever barriers may be
installed for the purpose of *not* allowing it. Do you think you're smarter
than the security experts that protect these facilities? You think you're
the first person to think of this? How large an ego do you have??
I won't go into details for obvious reasons..
Nor will I discuss the details of nuclear plant security in detail (I am not
privy to all the security details either). But your idea of plant security
is outdated and grossly oversimplified. Much of your scenario depends on
nuclear plant security being as lax as it was 30 years ago. It isn't. You
really think you're the only one that ever thought of these threats? Such
hubris.
Getting past security is a no-op.
Delivering weapon with 20ft of containment is a no-op.
Saying it doesn't make it true. It merely shows your ignorance and lack of
analytical thought.
A few years back(93), an escaped hospital patient drove a station
wagon through TMI-1's turbine building's alumium roll up door and
stopped inside. (Within ~200ft of reactor containment).
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1993/in93094.html
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/newsletter/?varQueryType=PrintVersion&NewsletterID=217
It took them four hours to find the intruder in the basement of the
turbine building.
You really have a pretty low esteem of the whole nuclear security process to
think security remains unchanged after such an incident. The reason you
were able to find that incident in the NRC documents is because when that
event occurred the NRC required each licensee to review and update their
security plans. Several more updates have occurred since then and since
9/11. The NRC allows that incident to be public knowledge and not
classified because they no longer believe such a scenario is a danger. Do
you really think the NRC would publish a 'blueprint' of how to attack a
facility on their own web if that hadn't eliminated that threat ??? Notice
the date of the event and the date of the publication. The public document
was released only *after* corrective actions were taken to prevent a
recurrence.
You are ignorant of the security at nuclear sites, and assume it hasn't
changed in decades. That really is pretty stupid. But it suits your agenda
of fear-mongering, so you do it anyway.
You claim to have insider knowledge of nuclear weapons capabilities and
understandably are reticent to discuss them. Yet you think you are aware of
all security measures around nuclear plants, that such security is detailed
in the public record and that security measures remain unchanged after
incidents. Guess you don't see the irony in that.
daestrom
You can get heat and electricity from it.
