D
David Lesher
- Jan 1, 1970
- 0
In June, DC Metro had a high speed crash when an inbound Red Line train
hit a stopped one. Nine died; about 80 were injuried.
Early on, suspicion has focused on the AC track signals used not just
there but worldwide. Such have been around for >100 years.
Track signals work by applying a current-limited voltage between the
rails at one end of a block, and having a relay across them at the other
end. When a train axle shorts the rails, the relay drops. Outside of very
rusty rails, the system is considered VERY reliable; in the fail safe
direction. [If it rains too hard, or a rail breaks, or....it shows as
occupied. That's OK; but NOT showing a train can be and has been fatal.]
On traction power [third rail or catenary power] systems; the signaling
is low frequency AC, with a "WeeZBond" low pass filter used to pass
the traction power return to the substation but block the signaling
frequencies.
The NTSB has just issued an urgent interim recommendation on such based
on their work to date.
<http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2009/R09_15_16.pdf>
The letter discusses the failure they found:
"Testing found that a spurious high-frequency modulated signal was being
created by parasitic oscillation from the power output transistors in the
track circuit module transmitter. This spurious signal propagated through
the power transistor heat sink, through the metal rack structure, and
through a shared power source into the associated module receiver, thus
establishing an unintended signal path. The spurious signal mimicked a
valid track circuit signal. The peak amplitude of the spurious signal
appeared at the correct time interval and was large enough to be sensed by
the module receiver as a valid track circuit signal, which energized the
track relay. This combination of an alternate signal path between track
circuit modules and a spurious signal capable of exploiting that
path bypassed the rails, and the ability of the track circuit to detect the
train was lost."
It's interesting to look at how even a time-proved, widely used, system
can fail in an unexpected way....and is a cautionary note for designers
of all kinds.
hit a stopped one. Nine died; about 80 were injuried.
Early on, suspicion has focused on the AC track signals used not just
there but worldwide. Such have been around for >100 years.
Track signals work by applying a current-limited voltage between the
rails at one end of a block, and having a relay across them at the other
end. When a train axle shorts the rails, the relay drops. Outside of very
rusty rails, the system is considered VERY reliable; in the fail safe
direction. [If it rains too hard, or a rail breaks, or....it shows as
occupied. That's OK; but NOT showing a train can be and has been fatal.]
On traction power [third rail or catenary power] systems; the signaling
is low frequency AC, with a "WeeZBond" low pass filter used to pass
the traction power return to the substation but block the signaling
frequencies.
The NTSB has just issued an urgent interim recommendation on such based
on their work to date.
<http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2009/R09_15_16.pdf>
The letter discusses the failure they found:
"Testing found that a spurious high-frequency modulated signal was being
created by parasitic oscillation from the power output transistors in the
track circuit module transmitter. This spurious signal propagated through
the power transistor heat sink, through the metal rack structure, and
through a shared power source into the associated module receiver, thus
establishing an unintended signal path. The spurious signal mimicked a
valid track circuit signal. The peak amplitude of the spurious signal
appeared at the correct time interval and was large enough to be sensed by
the module receiver as a valid track circuit signal, which energized the
track relay. This combination of an alternate signal path between track
circuit modules and a spurious signal capable of exploiting that
path bypassed the rails, and the ability of the track circuit to detect the
train was lost."
It's interesting to look at how even a time-proved, widely used, system
can fail in an unexpected way....and is a cautionary note for designers
of all kinds.